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INHERENT ATTORNEY CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST UNDER ERISA: USING THE
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT TO DISCOURAGE JOINT
REPRESENTATION OF DUAL ROLE
FIDUCIARIES
PAUL M. SECUNDA °
I. INTRODUCTION: THE MYSTERY OF VARITY CORP. V. HOWE
Most people who have read the United States Supreme
Court's opinion in Varity Corp. v. Howe' are struck by the
unbelievable machinations in which an employer will engage to
deprive his employees of their rightful health benefits under
ERISA.' In Varity, the company, acting in the dual role of
employer and plan fiduciary with regard to the company's health
plan, carried out a devious scheme to rid itself of its unprofitable
divisions.3 In so doing, the employer induced a large number of
employees to shift from their current health insurance plan to a
new health plan with a newly-formed subsidiary.4 Although the
company promised that the new subsidiary's health plan would
pay the same health benefits, unbeknownst to these employees,
that subsidiary was doomed to fail from the moment of its
existence.' When the subsidiary did inevitably sink into
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Mississippi School of Law. I
would like to thank Nicole Seale and Alexandra Hutton, both of the University
of Mississippi School of Law Class of 2007, for their excellent research and
writing assistance.
1. 516 U.S. 489 (1996).
2. Employee Retiree Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C.
§1001 et seq. (2000). As per convention, citation to ERISA sections in this
article have been conformed to the standardized citation form of ERISA
§ , which substitutes for citations to Title 29 of the United States Code.
3. 516 U.S. at 492-94.
4. Id. at 493-94. In all, some 1500 employees accepted the company's
assurances and voluntarily agreed to transfer to the new subsidiary. Id. at
494.
5. Id. The district court found that the subsidiary from the date of its
creation had a $46 million negative net worth. Id.
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receivership, the employees of the subsidiary not only lost their
jobs, but also their health benefits.'
What confuses many students and practitioners who read
Varity is why the employer utilized such an elaborate ruse to trick
his employees into forfeiting their health benefits. Under the well-
established settlor-function doctrine, an employer is free in his
settlor capacity 7 to create, amend, modify, or terminate an
employee benefit plan without being considered a fiduciary of the
plan and risking fiduciary liability under ERISA.' Thus, if the
employer wished to rid himself of the liabilities associated with
the health plan, he could have simply modified or terminated the
plan to achieve the desired savings.
In explaining the company's motives in Varity, the Supreme
Court assumed that the company took such a circuitous route in
depriving employees of their benefits in order to avoid the
"undesirable fallout" of "distressing" the remaining employees. °
Instead, by putting into action this scheme, the company hoped to
convince the remaining employees that the other employees'
benefits were "simply and automatically" terminated by the failure
of the subsidiary's business." Thus, as interpreted by the
Supreme Court, the company took such a convoluted course of
action in order to maintain the morale of its remaining employees
and, by extension, the company's productivity.
Be that as it may, an equally plausible alternative motivation
for the company's bizarre actions might have been related to the
difficult position in which a company places itself when it acts
simultaneously in both the role of employer and ERISA plan
fiduciary with regard to its employees. In such a situation, a dual
role fiduciary exists and it becomes difficult to ascertain the
capacity in which the company is interacting vis-A-vis its
employees. 2 Of course, the Varity Court ultimately decided that
the company was acting in its fiduciary capacity when it induced
its employees to switch over to the doomed subsidiary's health
6. Id.
7. A settlor is the "person who creates a trust." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS § 3(1)(1959).
8. Varity, 516 U.S. at 505 (citing Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen,
514 U.S 73, 78-81 (1995)).
9. The Varity Court recognized that the company had retained the right to
terminate the health benefits at issue, but did not do so. Id. at 493.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. As discussed in more detail below, ERISA expressly permits an
employer to act as both fiduciary and non-fiduciary (including in the role of
settlor) under ERISA § 408(c)(3). See discussion infra Part I.B.
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plan.3 Thus, it may have been that the company's actions in
Varity were also a means by which the company hoped to avoid
having a court decide whether it was acting in its employer or plan
fiduciary capacity by tying the loss of employee health benefits to
the "simple and automatic" dissolution of the newly-formed
subsidiary. 4
Read this way, Varity highlights how important it is that a
company be adequately counseled by its attorneys when it is
acting as a dual role fiduciary under ERISA in order to make sure
that it does not inadvertently expose itself to fiduciary liability as
Varity did. That being said, there is nothing in ERISA which
discusses the role counsel should play in dual role fiduciary cases
like Varity.6 Further, there is no formal legal restriction in
ERISA or anywhere else which prohibits an attorney from jointly
representing a given company in both its employer and fiduciary
capacities. 6
13. See Varity, 516 U.S. at 503 ("We conclude... that the factual context in
which the statements were made, combined with the plan-related nature of
the activity, engaged in by those who had plan-related authority to do so,
together provide sufficient support for the District Court's legal conclusion
that Varity was acting as a fiduciary.").
14. As the Court's ultimate decision makes clear, there was good reason for
the company to want to avoid this employer/fiduciary determination. Id.
Ironically, if the company had just relied on the settlor function doctrine, and
modified the plan outright, it would not have had to worry about being
characterized as an ERISA fiduciary.
15. "Regulation of ERISA lawyers was left primarily to state law, which
generally is based on ethical standards promulgated by the American Bar
Association." Gwen Thayer Handelman et al., Fundamentals of Employee
Benefits Law, Ethics, Privilege, and Related Issues in Employee Benefits
Practice, SJ068 ALI-ABA 719, 725 (2004). Another reason ERISA has little to
say about the role of attorneys in these dual role fiduciary situations is that it
is generally agreed that the plan's attorney is not acting in a fiduciary
capacity. See Ronald E. Mallen & Paul E. Vallone, Attorney Liability Under
ERISA: Myth or Reality, 68 DEF. COUNS. J. 435, 435-36 (2001) ("Attorneys
who perform services on behalf of a plan are seldom designated as fiduciaries
in the plan documents. Thus, attorneys must perform more than the 'usual
professional services' to be considered an ERISA fiduciary."); see also Useden
v. Acker, 947 F.2d 1563, 1577-78 (11th Cir. 1991) (finding that attorney's
occasional rendering of investment advice to ERISA plan did not render
attorney a fiduciary to plan).
16. Indeed, it is difficult to discern from the Varity decision whether the
same attorney represented the company in both its employer and fiduciary
capacities in that case. Moreover, even if the employer's counsel jointly
represented the employer in both capacities, courts have not found a "duty to
hire [an] independent counsel to help the [plan] committee interpret and
administer the plan." See Ashenbaugh v. Crucible Inc., 1975 Salaried
Retirement Plan, 854 F.2d 1516, 1531-32 (3d Cir. 1988); Donovan v. Bierwirth,
680 F.2d 263, 272 (2d Cir. 1982) (not requiring dual role fiduciaries to hire
20061
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Nevertheless, a common observation by sophisticated ERISA
attorneys is that it never wise to engage in such dual
representations. 7  Cases, including the famous Donovan v.
Bierwirth case detailed below, 8 however, do suggest that at least
some lawyers DO undertake such dual representations, either
inadvertently or purposefully, 9 even in light of the many ethical
and legal difficulties associated with such dual representations. 9
independent counsel in all conflict of interest situations).
17. But see Handelman, supra note 15, at 772 (implying that ERISA dual
representations may be more widespread than previously thought, by noting
that "it is possible to preserve the attorney-client privilege with respect to
advice given to a plan sponsor about settlor functions even if the same firm
advises both the fiduciaries and sponsor") (emphasis added).
18. Donovan, 680 F.2d 263. See infra Part IV.A (discussing the Donovan
case).
19. "Multiple representation in employee benefits practice may occur
inadvertently or by design." Handelman, supra note 15, at 734. See also ABA
SECTION OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW 1442
(2d. ed. 2000) [hereinafter EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW] ("[Ilnadvertent
[multiple) representation may occur when a lawyer advises corporate
employees acting on behalf of a client corporate plan sponsor that is a named
fiduciary if the employees are found also to be functioning as fiduciaries in
their own right" and that "[i]f a plan sponsor hires counsel to represent the
plan, both the plan entity and the plan sponsor may be considered clients for
conflicts-of-interest purposes."). Id. (citing Teradyne, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard
Co., 1991 WL 239940 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 1991)).
20. See Sherwin P. Simmons, Who Are the ERISA Clients? Plan Fiduciaries
or Plan Participants?, 55 TAX NOTES 1240, 1242 (1992) ("All too often, in 'real
life,' the same attorney [advises] the plan sponsor, usually on non-plan
matters as well as plan matters, the plan, and the plan fiduciaries."). For
examples of instances in which counsel have undertaken dual representation
of both plan sponsors and plan fiduciaries, and where litigation has ensued,
see United States v. Mett, 178 F.3d 1058, 1062 (9th Cir. 1999) (ERISA
attorney-client privilege case in which lawyer represented the fiduciaries, the
plan, and the company); In re Long Island Lighting Co., 129 F.3d 268, 271 (2d
Cir. 1997) (ERISA case regarding attorney-client privilege issues in which the
employer client used the same attorney to advise it on both settlor functions
and fiduciary functions); Washington-Baltimore Newspaper Guild, Local 35 v.
Washington Star Co., 543 F. Supp. 906, 909 (D.D.C. 1982) (ERISA case in
which former legal counsel to plan also worked for outside general counsel to
plan sponsor without any separation of services between various activities).
Even if more sophisticated in-house and outside ERISA attorneys
understand the dangers in representing a dual role fiduciary in both its
corporate entity and fiduciary capacities (for instance, because of the potential
loss of attorney-client and work product doctrine privilege with regard to plan
participants, see EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAw, supra note 19, at 1442 ("If
conflicts between co-clients result in litigation, communications about plan
administration with a lawyer who has represented more than one party with
respect to the plan generally will not be protected under the attorney-client
privilege or work product doctrine.")), there will inevitably be less
sophisticated attorneys who will inadvertently and purposefully undertake
[39:703
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Therefore, to ethically guide those attorneys who do find
themselves considering engaging in such ERISA joint
representations, this article uses the relevant provisions of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct to discern the potential
pitfalls of such representations.2  The Model Rules speak
generically of how to identify the client in corporate situations22
and how to resolve concurrent conflicts of interests between co-
clients." However, neither the Model Rules themselves nor any of
the commentary on the Rules, addresses specific circumstances in
which an attorney (whether in-house or outside counsel)" is
permitted to jointly represent the employer qua employer, as well
as the employer as the fiduciary of an ERISA plan."
Because the current Model Rules as written do not contain
sufficient guidance for attorneys contemplating representing
ERISA dual-role fiduciaries in both capacities, this article
proposes a modification to the current Model Rules that would
address such "inherent attorney conflict of interest situations"
under ERISA."6 Although the new provision, denominated Rule
such dual role ERISA representations. It is these less sophisticated attorneys
who will most clearly benefit from the proposed amendment to the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct discussed herein.
21. It is uncontroverted that the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
through their state analogues, apply to ERISA attorneys as much as they
apply to any other attorney. See Andrew L. Oringer & Jason M. Rothschild,
Navigating Murky Waters: Ethics for the ERISA Lawyer in a Post-Enron
World, 649 PLI/TAX 349, 359 (2005) ("Like other attorneys, ERISA attorneys
must practice in accordance with the applicable state law standards for
attorney conduct, which are generally based on the standards provided by the
American Bar Association in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (the
"Model Rules"). It is noted that state rules will generally control, and that the
Model Rules are not themselves applicable.").
22. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2003)(discussing
organizations as clients).
23. Id. at R. 1.7.
24. The Model Rules generally do not make a distinction between in-house
and outside counsel when discussing the representation of corporate entities.
See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY: A STUDENT'S GUIDE 486 (2005)(discussing the similarity
between corporate and non-corporate entities).
25. Because employers commonly become ERISA dual role fiduciaries, see
Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA's Fundamental Contradiction: The
Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105, 1126 (1988) (observing that
employers "routinely exercise [the] authority" to act as dual role fiduciaries),
these types of dual representation ethical issues inevitably will arise.
26. Although "[tihe interests of a plan sponsor, fiduciaries, and
beneficiaries are not inherently adverse, [they] may become so in the event of
a trustee deadlock, employer delinquency, or litigation." Handelman, supra
note 15, at 737. As I will argue, I refer to these dual representation situations
as "inherent attorney conflicts of interest" because of the inevitability of some
20061
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1.13(h), would not ban outright joint representation of dual role
fiduciaries under ERISA,27 it would establish a strong presumption
against such joint representations.' This presumption against
joint representation is based on the inevitable conflicts of interest
that develop between the non-fiduciary interests of the employer
in making business decisions and the fiduciary interests of the
employer as plan administrator in acting in the best interests of
the plan's participants and beneficiaries.' The Varity case
paradigmatically demonstrates this conflict of interest dynamic."
The proposed rule and commentary would also require that
counsel assure herself under the conflict of interest principles for
current and former clients under Model Rules 1.7 and 1.9 that
such recurring conflicts will not jeopardize the effectiveness of the
legal representation for either the company or the plan.31 Only
then can counsel ethically carry on a joint representation under
these circumstances. Even then, the potential loss of evidentiary
privileges, such as attorney-client privilege and the work product
doctrine privilege, may lead counsel to decline dual
representation.3 2
In short, the proposed revision to the Model Rules is
necessary because even though it may be the general practice of
sophisticated ERISA counsel to always decline such joint
representations, there should nevertheless be some express ethical
guidance in place to put on notice those who are not as familiar
with the legal minefield that is ERISA and so that junior
such conflict arising when the employer acts in dual capacities in these
scenarios. See infra Part V.A.
27. See infra note 134 (discussing the proper role of ethical guidelines).
28. See discussion infra Part V.B. (discussing proposed Model Rule on
ERISA joint representations).
29. See discussion infra Part II.B. See also Handelman, supra note 15, at
741 (observing that under Model Rule 1.16, "counsel for co-clients may have
an ethical duty to withdraw from representing both the employer and the plan
if their interests become adverse").
30. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 498 (1996) ("Varity was both an
employer and the benefit plan's administrator, as ERISA permits.") (emphasis
in the original).
31. As will be discussed in more detail below, these types of situations may
implicate Model Rule 1.9 dealing with former clients in cases in which an
attorney has initially represented the dual-role fiduciary in both capacities,
but currently seek to represent the entity in only one capacity. See infra Part
III.C.
32. EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, supra note 20, at 1442 ("If conflicts between
co-clients result in litigation, communications about plan administration with
a lawyer who has represented more than one party with respect to the plan
generally will not be protected under the attorney-client privilege or work
product doctrine.").
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attorneys in ambivalent ethical situations can back up their stance
by pointing to clear ethical guidelines."3
This article presents the argument for proposed Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.13(h) in five parts. Part II introduces
fiduciary law under ERISA and explains the reasons for, and the
characteristics of, the dual role fiduciary. Part III discusses how
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct generally inform the
ethical conduct of an attorney when she represents two potentially
adverse entities simultaneously. Part IV documents the lack of
ethical guidance provided to counsel in the dual role fiduciary
context under the current version of the Model Rules through the
explanatory device of the famous ERISA fiduciary case of Donovan
v. Bierwirth. Part V concludes by proposing Rule 1.13(h), with
commentary, which establishes a strong presumption against
corporate counsel simultaneously representing the employer in its
corporate and ERISA plan fiduciary capacities.
II. A BRIEF ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW PRIMER
In analyzing an attorney's ethical obligations to a corporation
in both its employer and plan fiduciary capacities, it is helpful to
first understand who is a fiduciary under ERISA and the
consequences attendant to such designations. Thereafter, it is
necessary to examine how ERISA law makes a significant
departure from the common law of trusts;34 a departure which
permits a dual role fiduciary to exist in the first instance.35 This
33. The importance of having such ethical guidance in place for junior
attorneys facing tough ethical quandaries is made evident through
consideration of the case of Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1982),
discussed below. See infra Part IV.A.2.
34. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110-11 (1989)
(describing ERISA as having its roots in the common law of trusts).
35. Generally, under the common law of trusts, the same person cannot be
both the settlor and fiduciary at the same time, as trustees at common law are
not permitted to act in a disloyal manner to the interests of the beneficiaries of
the trust. See NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329-30 (1981) (holding
that a trustee at common law "bears an unwavering duty of complete loyalty
to the beneficiary of the trust, to the exclusion of the interests of all other
parties. To deter the trustee from all temptation and to prevent any possible
injury to the beneficiary, the rule against a trustee dividing his loyalties must
be enforced with 'uncompromising rigidity.' A fiduciary cannot contend 'that,
although he had conflicting interests, he served his masters equally well or
that his primary loyalty was not weakened by the pull of his secondary one.'");
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 (2005) (discussing the more
stringent duty of loyalty under the common law of trusts). But see John H.
Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best
Interest?, 114 YALE L. J. 929, 933-34 (2005) (suggesting that a trustee's duty of
20061
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section will examine these background issues in detail so that the
reader may more readily comprehend the ethical quandary in
which corporate counsel finds herself when contemplating jointly
representing an ERISA dual role fiduciary.
A. Fiduciary Status and Obligations Under ERISA
In order to establish an employee benefit plan under ERISA,36
it is necessary to fulfill a number of technical prerequisites."7 At
the very least, every plan must be established and maintained by
a written instrument.38 Importantly, this written instrument must
provide for one or more named plan fiduciaries that are jointly and
severally responsible for controlling and managing the operation
and administration of the plan."9 Furthermore, an employee
benefit plan may provide that any person or group of persons may
serve in more than one fiduciary capacity with respect to the
plan.4" For instance, one person can serve in the role of both
administrator and trustee to the plan.4'
An equally significant prerequisite for an employee benefit
plan under ERISA is that its assets be held in trust by one or more
trustees.42 These trustees, in turn, have exclusive authority and
loyalty be softened such that actions taken with "the best interest" of the
beneficiary in mind should be permitted).
36. An employee benefit plan can either be an employee pension benefit
plan or employee welfare benefit plan, which is established or maintained by
the employer for the purpose of providing certain designated benefits to plan
participants and beneficiaries. ERISA §§ 3(1)-(3).
37. In addition to the technical requirements under ERISA, employee
pension plans must meet certain qualification standards under the Internal
Revenue Code (IRC) for employers and plan participants to be able to qualify
for tax advantages associated with the employee benefit plan. See U.S.C. §
401 (2002).
38. ERISA § 402(a)(1).
39. Id. The named plan fiduciary can either be named specifically in the
plan document, named pursuant to a procedure specified in the plan, or
identified as a fiduciary by an employer or employee organization. Id.
Moreover, the plan must describe a procedure for the allocation of
responsibilities for the operation and administration of the plan. ERISA §
402(b)(2).
40. ERISA § 402(c)(1).
41. Id.
42. § 403(a). In fact, the primary source for the fiduciary responsibilities
contained in ERISA is the common law of trust. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516
U.S 489, 496 (1996) (citing Central States, Southeast, and Southwest Areas
Pension Fund v. Central Transport, Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 570 (1985)). That being
said, "ERISA's standards and procedural protections partly reflect a
congressional determination that the common law of trusts did not offer
completely satisfactory protection." Id. at 497 (citing ERISA § 2).
[39:703
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discretion to manage and control the assets of the plan."
Nevertheless, not all fiduciaries are created equal as far as their
responsibilities to the plan are concerned. Whereas ordinary
trustees have discretion and control over all facets of plan
management and administration, directed trustees are only
fiduciaries "to the extent" that they exercise discretionary control
over some plan function." Moreover, these directed trustees are
required to follow the directions of other trustees, unless such
actions would be in violation of Title I of ERISA.45 Thus, whereas
a plan administrator is likely to be both the named fiduciary and
an ordinary trustee of the plan, a bank which holds the plan
assets, though also a fiduciary, will more likely be a directed
trustee whose fiduciary liability is limited to the extent that it
discretionarily administers the plan. '
If an individual is considered a fiduciary or trustee of a plan,
she owes a number of fiduciary duties to the plan. These fiduciary
duties can be generically divided into four categories: (1) the duty
of loyalty (exclusive benefit rule); (2) the duty of prudence; (3) the
duty of prudent diversification; and (4) the duty to follow the
terms of the plan unless contrary to the terms of ERISA.47
For purposes of this article, the most important of these
duties is the duty of loyalty which requires a fiduciary or trustee
to look with an "eye single" toward the interest of the participants
and beneficiaries and to act for the exclusive purpose of providing
benefits to participants and their beneficiaries.' Quite literally,
43. ERISA § 403(a).
44. ERISA § 403(a)(1) (describing the role of the directed trustee). See also
§ 3(21)(A) ("[A] person is a fiduciary with respect to the plan to the extent (i) he
exercises any discretionary authority... respecting management of such
plan..., (ii) he renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation,...
or (iii) he has any discretionary authority.., in the administration of such
plan.") (emphasis added).
45. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(D).
46. ERISA § 3(21)(A)(iii); § 403(a).
47. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A)-(D). There are, of course, other types of fiduciary
duties, including co-fiduciary duties under ERISA § 405 and the prohibited
transaction rules under ERISA §§ 406-408, but those topics are beyond the
scope of this article.
48. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A). Judge Friendly first used the "eye single"
terminology in Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 271 (2d. Cir. 1982).
Closely connected to this duty of loyalty is the duty of care which requires a
fiduciary to act in the same manner as a prudent fiduciary would under the
same circumstances. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B). Not uncommonly, not acting in
the best interests of, or for the exclusive benefit of, the participants and
beneficiaries of a plan will also involve conduct inconsistent with the expected
actions of a prudent ERISA fiduciary. See Donovan, 680 F.2d at 271
("Sections 404(a)(1)(A) and (B) impose three different although overlapping
standards.").
2006]
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this means that plan fiduciaries cannot place their own interests,
or that of others (including their company's), over the interests of
the participants and beneficiaries of the plan. If the fiduciary does
not meet these stringent standards, she may be held personally
liable to the plan for any plan losses or ill-gotten personal profits
caused by the breach of fiduciary duty. 9
B. The Inherently Conflicted ERISA Dual Role Fiduciary
In addition to all the provisions discussed above concerning
ERISA fiduciary status, one additional consideration for the
drafters of ERISA was whether to permit a company to act in both
an employer and plan fiduciary capacity at the same time. 50 If a
company were permitted to act simultaneously as both the
employer and a fiduciary to a plan, there could potentially be
competing interests. This is because corporate officers would have
to act in a fiduciary capacity with regard to their shareholders,5'
49. ERISA §§ 409, 502(a)(2). On the other hand, non-fiduciaries are
generally considered not liable under ERISA. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs.,
508 U.S. 248, 254 (1993) (finding no non-fiduciary liability under ERISA §
502(a)(3) for knowing participation in a breach of fiduciary duty). But see
Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 241
(2000) (permitting non-fiduciary liability for a "party in interest" involved in a
prohibited transaction with a fiduciary under ERISA § 502(a)(3)).
50. Traditionally, under the common law of trusts, this conundrum was not
usually at issue for two reasons. First, the settlor was usually dead by the
time the trust fiduciary started to exercise her fiduciary powers and
consequently, the settlor and fiduciary were not the same person. See Jeffrey
E. Shuren, Legal Accountability for Utilization Review in ERISA Health
Plans, 77 N.C. L. REV. 731, 760-61 (1999) ("Under an ordinary private trust,
the property owner, or settlor, transfers property for the benefit of one or more
beneficiaries to a third party, the trustee. The rationale behind imposing
fiduciary obligations on the trustee stems from the typical trust creation
scenario wherein the settlor may die or the beneficiaries are incapable of
managing the funds."). Second, the trustee only had that power invested in
her by the settlor. See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 262 (noting that under the
common law, fiduciary status was determined by virtue of the position a
person held). This is not so in ERISA, where a person can become a functional
fiduciary of the plan through undertaking discretionary actions on behalf of
the plan even if that person seeks to avoid fiduciary status or liability. See
ERISA § 3(21)(A); Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 527 (1996) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) ("In defining the term 'fiduciary' in § 3(21)(A) of ERISA, Congress
struck a balance that it believed would protect plan participants without
impinging on the ability of employers to make business decisions. In
recognition that ERISA allows trustee-beneficiary arrangements that the
common law of trusts generally forbids, Congress "defined 'fiduciary' not in
terms of formal trusteeship, but in functional terms of control and authority
over the plan.'") (citing Mertens, 508 U.S. at 262).
51. See D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L.
277, 278 (1998) ("Corporate directors have a fiduciary duty to make decisions
[39:703
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while as trustees of the plan, they would have to act in the best
interests of the participants and beneficiaries of the plan." As
Varity establishes, these types of scenarios involving conflicting
fiduciary duties in the ERISA context are not uncommon. 5 In
such circumstances, particular individuals might be called upon to
act in both an employer and a plan fiduciary capacity for the
company at the same time.5'
Nevertheless, even in the face of these considerations which
would seem to argue against allowing dual role fiduciaries, ERISA
that are in the best interests of the shareholders.").
52. See ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A). Moreover, unlike under traditional trust law,
employers and their employees can inadvertently become fiduciaries under
ERISA by engaging in discretionary action as concerns the plan and its assets.
ERISA § 402(a); ERISA § 3(21)(A). Thus, employers may have dueling
fiduciary obligations to shareholders and plan beneficiaries without even
realizing it. See EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, supra note 20, at 1441-42 (noting
that multiple representations under ERISA may occur "inadvertently or by
design," and that inadvertent representations should be avoided); see also
Schiffli Embroidery Workers Pension Fund v. Ryan, Beck & Co., No. 91-5433,
1994 WL 62124, at *3 (D.N.J. Feb. 23, 1994) (finding that inadvertent
representation under ERISA may occur due to a party's perception).
53. See Varity, 516 U.S. at 493-94; see also Arthur B. Laby, Resolving
Conflicts of Duty in Fiduciary Relationships, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 75, 141 (2004)
("When the same plan fiduciary, however, also serves as an officer or director,
and therefore as a fiduciary to the company shareholders (and the company
itself), conflicts inevitably arise."). Not only will such interests conflict with
important decisions regarding the very survival of the company, but such
conflicting fiduciary duties occur on an every day basis regarding decisions as
mundane as whether to deny a specific claim under a plan or deciding to have
a plan invest in company stock as a plan asset. See COLLEEN N. MEDILL,
INTRODUCTION TO EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW: POLICY AND PRACTICE 409
(2004).
54. In such situations, Judge Friendly counseled, "[slince their
judgment... could scarcely be unbiased, at the least [these dual role
fiduciaries] were bound to take every feasible precaution to see that they had
carefully considered the other side, to free themselves, if indeed this was
humanly possible, from any taint of the quick negative reaction characteristic
of targets of hostile tender offers." Donovan, 680 F.2d at 276. That being said,
it is not a breach of fiduciary duty if the individual's decision as a fiduciary
results in an incidental benefit to the employer. Trenton v. Scott Paper Co.,
832 F.2d 806, 809 (3d Cir. 1987). But see Fischel & Langbein, supra note 25, at
1128:
The device of characterizing the benefit to the employer as 'incidental'
misses the point by confusing the ex ante and ex post perspectives. The
relevant question is not whether the trustee's conduct creates only an
'incidental' benefit for the employer ex post, a difficult and ultimately
futile inquiry. Rather, the relevant question is whether the trustee's
conduct is consistent with the understanding that the employees and
the employer would have reached had they bargained over the issue ex
ante. Any other approach will lower the rate of plan formation to the
detriment of employees and employers alike.
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expressly permits them.55 In this regard, ERISA § 408(c)(3) states:
"[n]othing in [the prohibited transaction rules] shall be construed
to prohibit any fiduciary from - . . . (3) serving as a fiduciary in
addition to being an officer, employee, agent, or other
representative of a party in interest."' It may be, as Professor
Langbein has recently suggested, that "[t]he court-created
disclosure duties of ERISA fiduciaries respond to (and to some
extent compensate for) the widespread use of conflicted fiduciaries
in ERISA plan administration." 7 Moreover, allowing non-neutral
fiduciaries helps to promote the formation of voluntary ERISA
benefit plans. 8
Consequently, ERISA does not prohibit an officer or employee
of a given employer from being a fiduciary or trustee to the plan
while simultaneously acting in a corporate or non-fiduciary
capacity. In her non-fiduciary capacity, the officer or employee of
the company may act as a settlor to establish, modify, amend, or
terminate a plan without becoming a fiduciary. 9 This is because
55. Perhaps, ERISA drafters permitted dual role fiduciaries because they
feared that if ERISA required employers wanting to set up employee benefit
plans to contract out its plan administration to a third-party administrator,
many companies who otherwise might offer such plans would opt out all
together because of the increased administration expenses and the lack of
control over plan design. See Fischel & Langbein, supra note 25, at 1127
(suggesting that permitting dual role fiduciaries promotes the rate of plan
formation under ERISA by giving employers investment and design
authority); see also id. at 1128 (recognizing that ERISA § 408(c)(3) makes
some sense if one considers that under some circumstances the employer may
also be a beneficiary of the plan).
56. ERISA § 408(c)(3). In turn, a "party in interest" under ERISA
specifically includes "an employer any of whose employees are covered by [an
employee benefit] plan." § 3(14)(C); see also Curtiss-Wright Corp. v.
Schoonejongen, 514 U.S 73, 78 (1995) (acknowledging the permissibility of an
employer's being both a settlor and fiduciary in the context of a welfare benefit
plan); Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 890 (1996) (acknowledging the
permissibility of an employer's being both a settler and fiduciary in the
context of a retiree benefit plan).
57. See Langbein, supra note 35, at 950-51. Langbein, along with Professor
Fischel, has also maintained that, "[tihe tension [of having nonneutral
fiduciaries] disappears once it is recognized that in pension plans, unlike
traditional trusts, employers and employees are both settlors and
beneficiaries. Dual loyalty is simply a recognition of this basic point"). See
Fischel & Langbein, supra note 25, at 1126.
58. See John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means By "Equitable": The
Supreme Court's Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great West, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1317, 1327-28 (2003) ("In order to encourage employers to
sponsor plans, ERISA facilitates the use of employer personnel as plan
fiduciaries, in tension with the disinterested intermediary who is the
prototype in ordinary trust law.").
59. See Curtiss-Wright, 514 U.S. at 78.
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according to the "settlor-function doctrine," in taking these settlor
actions, the company and its agents are not engaging in
discretionary activity with regard to the plan and therefore, are
not subject to fiduciary liability. ° Indeed, since much depends on
whether a company or individual is characterized as a fiduciary or
settlor, it is not surprising that much time and litigation expenses
have been spent trying to determine which capacity a company
and its agents in a particular case are acting when interacting
with plan participants and beneficiaries with regard to their plan
benefits.6 '
What has not been explored to the same degree is the plight
of a company's counsel, whether in-house or outside," when the
company chooses to become a dual role fiduciary. The company
will then act at different times, through the same and different
officers and employees, in both its employer and fiduciary
capacities. In this context, the question then arises whether
counsel should ever represent a company in both its employer and
plan fiduciary capacities.'
In order to properly discern the ethical dilemmas that
corporate counsel faces in such dual representation scenarios, it is
first necessary to understand the rules of professional
responsibility as they concern the identification of the client in the
corporate context and how to resolve concurrent conflicts of
interest when counsel simultaneously represents two adverse
entities. Therefore, this article next turns to a general discussion
of an attorney's ethical obligations in the corporate context.
III. ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS OF CORPORATE COUNSEL IN THE ERISA
CONTEXT
Much of the confusion over whom ERISA counsel represents
when a company acts as both as an employer (plan sponsor) and
60. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
61. See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 443-45 (1999)
(finding that amending a contributory defined benefit plan is a settlor
function); Spink, 517 U.S. at 887-91 (concluding that amending a retirement
plan is a settlor function not subject to fiduciary liability); Varity Corp. v.
Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 505-06 (1996) (holding that amending or terminating a
welfare plan is not an act of plan management or administration); Curtiss-
Wright, 514 U.S. at 78 (finding that adopting, amending, or terminating an
employee welfare plan is not a fiduciary action).
62. "[The Model Rules of Professional Conduct] draws no distinction
between in-house and outside counsel, or among types or sizes of entities." See
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, supra note 20.
63. Although some might argue that such dual representations are rare,
contemporary scholarship and recent litigation suggest otherwise. See supra
note 20 and accompanying text.
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fiduciary (plan administrator) with regard to an employee benefit
plan can be traced to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
Indeed, when the employer and plan act through the same
individual or group of individuals as permitted by ERISA, ERISA
counsel can inadvertently find themselves representing two
adverse entities.' Even when a company attempts to avoid these
direct conflicts of interest within the same person by appointing
one officer to represent the employer (for example, the President
or CEO) and a different officer to represent the plan (for example,
the Human Resources Manager),' corporate counsel still must
decide which entity (and/or individuals) they should represent, if
any, in such concurrent conflicts of interest.
To figure out the difficult ethical questions occasioned by dual
role fiduciaries, it is first necessary to examine closely three Model
Rules of Professional Conduct: Rule 1.13 concerning the identity of
the client and conflicts of interest in the entity setting, Rule 1.7
dealing generally with concurrent conflicts of interest, and Rule
1.9 dealing more specifically with conflicts of interest concerning
former clients. These rules will be examined with a focus on their
impact on corporate counsel in the ERISA context and whether
such rules provide sufficient ethical guidance in such
circumstances.
A. An Entity Theory of Ethics: Rule 1.13
Although Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.13 has
evolved since its adoption in 1983, it generally sets up an "entity
theory of ethics."' Under this entity theory, "[a] lawyer employed
or retained by an organization represents the organization acting
through its duly authorized constituents."67 However, if there is a
conflict of interest between the entity and an individual director,
64. ERISA § 402(c)(1). Not only does confusion result when an attorney
represents a given company in its employer and plan capacities, but even
within the plan itself, it is not always clear whether the attorney represents
the plan as an entity, the fiduciaries of the plan, or both. See John L. Utz,
Ethical Considerations in ERISA Litigation, SK079 ALI-ABA 1011, 1013
(2005).
65. Further, the employer may appoint different corporate officers to
undertake different types of fiduciary duties with regard to the plan. See
Fischel & Langbein, supra note 25, at 1126 (observing in this vein that "[iun
single employer plans, higher officers of the firm frequently oversee plan
investments while other managers handle various types of benefit
determination").
66. See ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 24, at 484.
67. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a) (1983). As the
commentary to the Rule aptly points out, entities necessarily act through
authorized agents. See id. at R. 1.13 cmt. 1.
[39:703
Inherent Attorney Conflicts of Interest Under ERISA
officer, or employee of the entity, counsel's first loyalty is to the
entity, and she must make clear such allegiance to individuals
when it is evident that the individuals' interests are adverse to
those of the organization.' That being said, counsel for an entity
may generally represent both the entity and individuals connected
with the entity when there is no conflict of interest between them,
and even when there is a conflict, the corporate entity can agree,
through a proper written consent, to have counsel represent both
the entity and the individual.69
Rule 1.13 only helps counsel identify the various clients in
such situations and leaves unanswered the question about whom
corporate counsel should represent in a conflict between two
entities. For instance, if a company chooses to act as both the
employer and a fiduciary to a plan, as permitted by ERISA §
408(c)(3), the lawyer has essentially agreed to a joint
representation of two entities, and their duly authorized
constituents. On the one hand, the attorney represents the
company in its plan sponsor or settlor capacity, or what one might
refer to as its normal corporate decision-making capacity. On the
other hand, the attorney represents the employee benefit plan, as
a separate entity, and its duly authorized constituents, including
the plan administrator and other plan fiduciaries and trustees,
who might very well be the same corporate officers of the
70
company.
The problem is compounded here because even though
ERISA permits individuals and entities to serve as dual role
fiduciaries, thereby allowing them to simultaneously maintain the
inherently conflicted roles of employer and fiduciary, 1 ERISA
provides no guidance to attorneys who represent the company in
both its employer and fiduciary capacities when a conflict of
interest arises between the two entities." To gain further insight
68. Id. at R. 1.13(f); see also Rule 4.3 (setting forth a duty to inform an
unrepresented individual of potential adversity between that individual and
the attorney's client').
69. Id. at R. 1.13(g).
70. That being said, as far as the lawyer's responsibility, under the law, to
the participants and beneficiaries of the plan, the majority rule is that, "a
lawyer who represents a fiduciary does not also represent the beneficiaries."
See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 380, at 1
(1994).
71. See Donald T. Bogan, ERISA: Re-Thinking Firestone in Light of Great-
West-Implications for Standard of Review and the Right to a Jury Trial in
Welfare Benefit Claims, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 629, 663 (2004) (discussing
the inherent conflict of interest that exists when an employer acts as both plan
sponsor and plan fiduciary).
72. Nor is this state of affairs surprising, as what is at stake is not a legal
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into how attorneys should ethically handle these concurrent
conflicts of interest, it is necessary to turn to Rule 1.7.
B. Concurrent Conflicts of Interest Under Rule 1.7
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7 requires that if a
concurrent conflict of interest arises between two separate clients
represented by the same attorney, such conflicts must be resolved
under Rule 1.7 or the attorney must not represent one of the
clients." In turn, a "concurrent conflict of interest" is defined as
either a direct conflict between two clients of the same lawyer," or
as involving a "significant risk" that the lawyer's representation of
one or more client will be "materially limited" by the lawyer's
responsibilities to another client, former client, or by a personal
interest of the lawyer."9
If there is a concurrent conflict of interest, an attorney may
represent both of the parties involved in the conflict only if four
conditions are met. First, the lawyer must "reasonably believe"
that she will be able to deliver competent and diligent
representation to all parties involved."6 Second, the representation
must not be prohibited by law." Third, the representation cannot
involve a claim by one of the clients against the other in the same
litigation." Fourth, and finally, each client must give written,
informed consent to the representation. 9
With regard to corporate counsel whose clients include both
the corporate entity and the employee benefit plan, there is no
issue concerning the second condition, as there is nothing in
ERISA which prohibits representation of such dual role
fiduciaries. As for the fourth condition, there might be more of an
issue, as Rule 1.13(g) does not permit a person involved in a
conflict of interest to consent to the conflict on behalf of the
entity. ° Consequently, it would appear that the corporation would
obligation under ERISA, but rather an ethical duty under state-based
professional ethics standards.
73. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(discussing conflict of
interest issues).
74. Id. at R. 1.7(a)(1).
75. Id. at R. 1.7(a)(2).
76. Id. at R. 1.7(b)(1).
77. Id. at R. 1.7(b)(2).
78. Id. at R. 1.7(b)(3).
79. Id. at R. 1.7(b)(4).
80. There is some doubt as to whether such consent would be effective since
the company would be consenting on behalf of two entities over which it
exercises control. See id. at R. 1.7 cmt. 29 (discussing certain common
representation scenarios where there are conflicts of interests of which the
parties may not consent).
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have to have someone in the organization not involved in the
conflict between the company and the plan (which may or may not
be possible) give written consent to the on-going conflict of
interest.
And as daunting as that issue may appear, there are even
more potentially difficult issues regarding the first and third
conditions under Rule 1.7(b). With regard to the first condition,
whether the attorney could reasonably believe that she could
provide equally diligent and competent representation to both the
employer and plan, would depend upon the totality of the
circumstances. Such circumstances would include the corporate
structure, the responsibilities the counsel actually has with regard
to each entity, and whether counsel is in-house or outside
counsel.81  Moreover, there are circumstances in which the
company in its employer and fiduciary capacities will be at
opposite tables in the same courtroom and, in such cases, counsel
will no doubt have to withdraw from both representations given
the third condition of Rule 1.7(b).8"
What can be gathered from this cursory analysis of Rule 1.7
and concurrent conflicts of interest in general is that there is no
bright line answer to whether an attorney can simultaneously
represent the employer and fiduciaries in the same company. It
depends on what the attorney "reasonably believes," given the
conflict with which she is presented. If counsel believes that the
requisite competence and diligence cannot be exercised under the
circumstances, the attorney must then decide whether to
withdraw her representation from both clients, at least until such
time as the conflict is resolved, or to continue to represent one
client and not the other. To explore what obligations counsel
would have to the dropped client if counsel chooses to continue
81. The last factor is of necessary importance, as outside counsel will be
much more easily able to exercise the independent judgment necessary to
make this difficult decision; whereas in-house counsel will be hard pressed to
maintain her professional independent judgment with regard to each client
under such circumstances. See ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 24, at
487 (noting some very important practical differences between in-house
counsel and outside counsel when it comes to the representation of a corporate
client, including the fact that in-house counsel only has one client).
82. Accord Steven D. Spencer, Ethical Issues Arising in ERISA Practice,
AMER. BAR ASSOC. CTR. FOR CONTINUING LEG. EDUC. NAT. INSTIT., N99ELI
ABA-LGLED I-1, 1-17 (Nov. 1999) (observing that even concerns of economic
efficiency will not overcome the real and truly disqualifying conflicts in dual
role fiduciary joint representations).
83. Of course, this assumes that there does not exist a non-consentable
situation under Rule 1.7(b)(2) or (3).
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representation of one of the entities, it is necessary to consider
Rule 1.9 regarding former clients.
C. Former Clients and the Limits Imposed by Rule 1.9
If corporate counsel decides to continue her representation of
the employer but to withdraw her representation from the
employee benefit plan because of a concurrent conflict of interest,
the ongoing obligations of counsel to the company as fiduciary to
the employee benefit plan would have to be determined. Indeed,
such ethical limitations based on representing the employee
benefit plan as a former client might make it significantly difficult
for counsel to continue to effectively represent the interests of the
company in its employer capacity. In this regard, the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct seem to suggest that an attorney who
initially represents both the employer and fiduciary within the
same company may withdraw from the company in its fiduciary
capacity, but in continuing to represent the employer would be
limited in this representation based on the guidelines for former
clients provided in Rule 1.9.
For instance, what if the reason counsel withdrew from
representing the employee benefit plan was because there was
about to be direct litigation between the company and the plan?
Clearly, under these circumstances, Rule 1.7 prohibits a
concurrent representation of both parties regardless of consent.'
Even after corporate counsel effected her withdrawal of
representation from the employee benefit plan and continued her
representation of the employer, counsel would be prohibited from
advising the employer in situations in which she represented the
employee benefit plan on the same or substantially same matter,
unless the former client gave informed consent, confirmed in
writing.85 Especially where officers of the company serve as both
corporate officers and plan trustees,' it is hard to know whether
such consent would be effective given the fact that individuals
involved in the conflict cannot consent on behalf of the entity
under Rule 1.13(g).87  Moreover, in subsequent matters, the
attorney could not use information relating to the plan that she
learned as counsel to the plan unless the information had become
general knowledge or if the Rules otherwise required or permitted
use of such information.'
84. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmts. 23, 29.
85. Id. at R. 1.9(a).
86. As was the case in Donovan, 680 F.2d 263, discussed in depth in Part
IV, infra.
87. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(g).
88. Id. at R. 1.9(c).
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Clearly, then, the former client counsel limitations could
make a continuing representation of the employer so constrained
that the only responsible thing for counsel to do would be to
withdraw from the representation of the company in its employer
capacity as well. In any event, in all of this maneuvering, there
would be much wasted time, resources, and money, as the plan
sponsor and the employee benefit plan would have to seek new
counsel, who would then have to familiarize themselves with the
current dispute between the two parties.89 Such an outcome is not
ideal for the company in general, and certainly not ideal for those
company officers who find themselves without experienced counsel
from either the fiduciary or employer side of the equation."
IV. ERISA DUAL ROLE FIDUCIARIES, CORPORATE COUNSEL,
AND THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Having examined in some detail the relevant ethical rules
that come into play when an attorney contemplates representing
an ERISA dual role fiduciary in both capacities, it is helpful to
consider an actual case to see what ethical problems may arise in
cases where attorneys have chosen to undertake such a dual
representation. One such complicated dual capacity fiduciary case
is the well-known case of Donovan v. Bierwirth.9' Although
Donovan was decided in 1982, before the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct existed,'considering the in-house counsel's
ethical obligations in Donovan under the current version of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct demonstrates the inadequacy
of the Model Rules in the dual role fiduciary context."
89. See Spencer, supra note 82, at 1-17 ("By retaining a single counsel who,
through longstanding contact, is thoroughly familiar with the employer's
business and the sponsored plans, the parties are more likely to receive
competent legal advice at a reasonable cost. Interposing ethical constraints
that are more theoretical than real detracts from this efficiency and increases
transaction costs through the hiring of new attorneys to service theoretical
individual interests.").
90. Id.
91. 680 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1982).
92. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct were first enacted in 1983.
Since that time, there have been important amendments to many of the
individual rules discussed herein, including amendments to Rule 1.13 in both
2002 and 2003. See ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 24, at 7-12
(discussing the Model Rules of Professional Conduct).
93. For a more recent and well-known example of the problems
surrounding dual role fiduciaries under ERISA, one need look no further than
the post-Enron collapse litigation, which serves as an example of the problems
that occur when a dual role fiduciary does not act with an eye single to the
interests of the plan's participants and beneficiaries. See Laby, supra note 53,
at 142 (stating that Enron employees who participated in three ERISA
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A. Donovan v. Bierwirth: A Case Study of an Inherently
Conflicted Counsel in the ERISA Dual-Role Fiduciary Context
1. Facts Surrounding the ERISA Dual Role Fiduciaries' Breach
of Fiduciary Duty
In Donovan, corporate officers of the Grumman Corporation
were also trustees of the company's pension benefit plan.94 In
particular, the employer and plan fiduciary capacities of the
company co-existed in the persons of John C. Bierwirth (chairman
of the Board of Directors), Robert G. Freese (the chief financial
officer), and Carl A. Paladino (treasurer).9" The company and the
plan were in turn both represented by the associate general
counsel of Grumman, John Mullan.'
The conflict of interest between Grumman and its pension
plan arose when a hostile takeover bid was initiated by LTV
Corporation in the fall of 1981.9' LTV offered to buy up to 70% of
the outstanding common stock of Grumman at $45 per share,
while the Grumman shares at the time were trading in the $24-
$27 range.9 At the time of the tender offer by LTV, the Grumman
pension plan owned approximately 4% of the company (or some
525,000 shares of Grumman).' Through its corporate officers,
including Bierwirth, Freese, and Paladino, Grumman fought
aggressively against the LTV takeover bid and attempted to
convince its shareholders that they should not sell their shares of
stock to LTV."° Moreover, as trustees of the Grumman pension
plan, the same three individuals not only decided not to sell the
pension plan's shares to LTV, but made it even more difficult for
LTV to succeed in its tender offer by having the pension fund buy
another 1.158 million shares of Grumman stock at the then-
inflated price of $36-$39/share.'0 ' Thus, through both corporate
and pension plan action, Grumman and its officers/trustees were
employee pension benefit plans alleged that "committees, trustees, and
individuals administering the plans, many of whom were individual officers
and directors of Enron, breached their fiduciary duties under ERISA") (citing
In re Enron Corp. Sec. Derivative & ERISA Litig., 284 F. Supp. 2d 511 (S.D.
Tex. 2003)).
94. Donovan, 680 F.2d at 264.
95. Id. at 267.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 265-66.
98. Id. at 266.
99. Id. at 269.
100. Id. at 266-67.
101. Id. at 269. As a result, the plan went from owing a little less than 4% of
Grumman's outstanding shares to owning 8% of those shares. Id.
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able to help defeat the takeover attempt by LTV."' After the LTV
offer was defeated, the price of Grumman stock eventually
dropped to about $26/share. As a result, the pension plan lost, at
the time of the Second Circuit's decision in 1982, approximately
$12 million.103
In this scenario, there was a clear conflict of interest between
the corporate officers' role as fiduciaries to the shareholders"M and
their role as trustees with fiduciary duties to the participants and
beneficiaries of the pension plan."5 Most obviously, the pension
plan could have made a handsome profit for plan participants and
beneficiaries by accepting LTV's offer at $45/share when shares
were selling in the $25/share range (with 500,000 shares in hand,
that would have been over a $10 million profit)." Not only did the
trustees not seem to heed what was in the best interests of the
participants and beneficiaries by not agreeing to sell the shares, 107
but they compounded their breach of fiduciary duty by having the
102. Id. As it actually happened, the LTV take-over bid was doomed to
failure because its tender offer was eventually enjoined by the district court
based on inadequate disclosures and a potential antitrust violation under
Section 7 of the Clayton Act. See id. at 265 (citing Grumman Corp. v. LTV
Corp., 527 F. Supp. 86 (E.D.N.Y.), affd, 665 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1981)).
Nevertheless, the fact that the take-over bid would have failed even without
the Grumman officers' intervention did not excuse those officers' breach of
fiduciary conduct to the plan's beneficiaries. Id. at 271.
103. Id. at 269. Interestingly, seventeen months after the trustees' purchase
of Grumman stock to fend off the LTV hostile take-over bid, they sold the
Grumman shares, with the permission of the district court, at over $47/per
share and earned over $13 million through this investment. See Donovan v.
Bierwirth, 754 F.2d 1049, 1051 (2d Cir. 1985). Although this eventual
outcome is interesting from the standpoint of determining whether there was
an "investment loss" for purposes of personal fiduciary liability under ERISA
§ 409, the eventual success of the investment does not take away from the fact
that the plan trustees breached their fiduciary duties by failing to act at all
times with the best interests of the plan participants and beneficiaries in
mind. See Donovan, 680 F.2d at 276 (finding that the trustees had not
measured up to the high standards imposed by sections 404(a)(1)(A) and (B) of
ERISA); see also id. at 271 (noting that ERISA trustees have a duty "to avoid
placing themselves in a position where their acts as officers or directors of the
corporation will prevent their functioning with the complete loyalty to
participants demanded of them as trustees of a pension plan").
104. See Smith, supra note 51, at 278.
105. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A). Of course, there might also have been a conflict
based on the personal interests of the officers involved given their likely
ownership of company stock. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.7(a)(2).
106. Donovan, 680 F.2d at 265-66.
107. Id. at 273-74.
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pension plan buy an additional million shares of Grumman stock




In bringing a suit against Grumman and its officers/trustees
on behalf of the plan participants and beneficiaries, the Secretary
of Labor alleged that the company and its officers/trustees had
breached a number of fiduciary duties under ERISA § 404.19
Indeed, the Secretary was successful in bringing these claims, as
the officers/trustees had quite clearly not acted with an "eye
single" to the interests of the participants and beneficiaries in
attempting to defeat the LTV tender offer.11 ° Unlike in Varity,
however, the Donovan court, in the voice of Judge Friendly,
specifically addressed the ethical dilemma in-house counsel faced
in representing Grumman in both its corporate and fiduciary
capacities.
2. The Ethical Obligations of In-House Counsel When
Representing ERISA Dual Role Fiduciaries
As stated above, John Mullan was not only the associate
general counsel of Grumman, but he also acted as counsel to the
trustees concerning their pension plan obligations."1  From the
facts of Donovan, it is clear that Mullan attempted to advise the
plan trustees of, at least, their fiduciary obligations to act in the
best interests of the participants and beneficiaries."' Although it
is less clear whether Mullan was involved in the Grumman Board
of Director's decision to oppose the LTV tender offer, there is
reason to believe that as associate general counsel he would have
been involved in the Board's actions in this regard."'
108. Id. at 274 ("An even more telling point against the trustees is their
swift movement from a decision not to tender or sell their shares already in
the fund to a decision to invest more than $44,000,000 in the purchase of
additional Grumman shares up to the 10% maximum permitted by § 407(a)(2)
of ERISA."); see also id. at 275 ("Moreover, and even more important, in
purchasing additional shares when they did, the trustees were buying into
what, from their own point of view, was almost certainly a 'no-win'
situation.").
109. Id. at 264. Prohibited transaction claims under ERISA § 406(b) were
also brought, but unsuccessfully. Id.
110. In Donovan, the court concluded that it was "almost impossible to
believe that [the trustees']... motive for purchasing the additional shares was
for any purpose other than blocking the LTV offer." Id. at 275.
111. Id. at 272.
112. Id. at 268 (describing a ten-minute presentation Mullan made to the
plan trustees, which included mention of the trustee's obligations to act in the
best interests of the participants of the plan).
113. See id. at 266-67 (not specifically placing Mullan at the Board of
Director's meeting which decided to oppose the LTV tender offer); but see id. at
272 (noting that Mullan, as in-house counsel, was under a "similar disability"
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Consequently, it appears that Mullan was in the position of
counseling two separate entities at the same time that had a direct
conflict of interest with one another. Although Mullan in his legal
capacity was most likely not acting in a fiduciary capacity, and
thus was not in violation of a duty imposed by ERISA,14 there is
nevertheless the serious ethical question that needs to be
addressed under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
concerning concurrent conflicts of interest.
In order to discern Mullan's ethical obligations under these
circumstances, it is necessary to start by identifying the various
clients represented by Mullan in his position as associate general
counsel to the Grumman Corporation. In fact, he actually
represented two separate entities based on Rule 1.13: the
employer and the pension plan. Consequently, when the employer
and plan had a directly conflicting interest, or at least there was a
significant risk that the representation would be materially
limited as a result of the LTV bid,115 Mullan had an ethical duty to
resolve that concurrent conflict of interest under Rule 1.7.
Yet, Mullan was under a "similar disability" as the
director/trustees themselves."6  As Judge Friendly observed,
Mullan was a junior employee in the organization and could have
"hardly been expected to tell the trustees that the better course
would be to resign or even to suggest investigations which might
alter the judgment of total commitment to defeating the LTV offer
that management had already expressed.""7 Although the court
refused to lay down a per se rule that dual role fiduciaries must
always engage independent counsel for the plan in such
circumstances, Judge Friendly suggested that Mullan should have
as the director/trustees in being torn between divided loyalties).
114. See Thayer, supra note 15, at 725.
115. There was a direct conflict of interest because even though selling the
pension plan stock to LTV might have been in the best interest of the plan and
the prudent thing for the fiduciaries to do under the circumstances,
Grumman, in its corporate capacity, had clearly decided that it was in the best
interests of its shareholders to fight off the LTV tender offer. Donovan, 680
F.2d at 272. Because the corporate officers and the trustees of the pension
plan were the same people, they had an irreducible conflict of interest in the
two roles which they occupied. See id. ("Bierwirth and Freese should have
been immediately aware of the difficult position which they occupied as a
result of having decided as directors some of the same questions they would
have to decide as trustees, and should have explored where their duty lay.").
And even if the interests involved were not directly adverse, there was a very
significant risk that his continued representation of both entities would
materially limit Mullan's responsibilities to each of his clients. See MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2).
116. Donovan, 680 F.2d at 272.
117. Id.
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withdrawn his representation from the plan, and that the
company should have hired an independent counsel who, in the
court's words, was "above the battle.""'8
Judge Friendly's hunch on how the company should have
acted in this instance appears consistent with a concurrent
conflicts of interest analysis under the current version of Model
Rule 1.7. Consistent with Rule 1.7, Mullan should have
reasonably believed that in representing both the employer and
the plan, he would not be sacrificing the competent and diligent
representation which each of the affected clients deserved." 9
Based on his junior standing and unwillingness to derail the
company's plan of fighting off the LTV offer, objectively, Mullan
was unable to satisfy his ethical responsibilities in this regard."'
Furthermore, and considering the language of Rule 1.7(b)(4),"'
there does not seem to have been any way to have resolved this
conflict, as this appears to be one of those conflicts wherein the
positions of the two entities are so diametrically opposed that a
good faith, written consent to dual representation could not have
been obtained. 2  Thus, the Rule 1.7 analysis leads inexorably to
118. Id. at 272-73.
119. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(1); see also id. at R. 1.7
cmt. 14. Although many concurrent conflicts of interests are waivable if client
consent is obtained, certain conflicts may not be consented to by the parties.
Included in this category of conflicts are those scenarios involving
circumstances under which the lawyer cannot reasonably conclude that he will
be able to provide the necessary level of competence and diligence to both
clients. Id. at R. 1.7 cmt. 15.
120. Mullan must have had more than a subjective belief that he could have
diligently and competently represented both entities; the Model Rules require
that he "reasonably believed" that such representation would be effective,
suggesting an objective standard based on what the prudent attorney would
have done under similar circumstances. See Florence Vincent, Regulating
Intimacy of Lawyers: Why Is It Needed and How Should It Be Approached, 33
U. TOL. L. REV. 645, 656 (2002) ("The consent called for in [Model Rule] 1.7(b)
must be effective, which incorporates the objective standard called for by how
a reasonable lawyer would act.").
121. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(4) ("[A] lawyer may
represent a client if: .... (4) each affected client gives informed consent,
confirmed in writing.").
122. See R. 1.13(g) (persons involved in conflict of interest themselves cannot
consent to conflict on behalf of entity). In other words, this set of
circumstances might represent one of those common representation situations
in which the lawyer cannot be impartial between the two entities because of
what is required of her in advising one entity versus the other. Id. at R. 1.7
cmt. 29. Moreover, a situation to which parties may not consent would also
arise in this case because the employer, as plan sponsor, was being sued by
the plan administrator on behalf of the participants and beneficiaries of the
plan. Id. at R. 1.7 cmt. 17 ("Paragraph (b)(3) describes conflicts that are
nonconsentable because of the institutional interest in the vigorous
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the same conclusion that Judge Friendly came to without the
benefit of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Under the
facts of Donovan, Mullan should not have been permitted to
represent both the employer and the plan, and an independent
counsel should have been brought in to advise and counsel the
plan trustees under the circumstances.'
Although it is conceivable that Mullan, once he recognized his
inherently conflicted position, could have continued his
representation of the company, better practice dictates that
Mullan should have completely withdrawn from representing the
company in both its employer and plan administrator capacity in
this or substantially similar matters in the future."" This is
because Mullan's representation of the company as employer most
likely would have required him to rely on information that he had
previously learned in his former capacity as counsel to the plan."'
In this regard, the Model Rules seem fairly unambiguous in
stating that "the lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a
manner shall not thereafter represent another person in the
same... manner in which that person's interests are materially
adverse to the interests of the former client.""6 Moreover, even if
development of each client's position when the clients are aligned directly
against each other in the same litigation or other proceeding before a
tribunal.").
123. In addition, Mullan's representation of both the corporation and the
plan under these circumstances might have been materially limited by his
own personal interests in the outcome of the hostile takeover bid, since not
only did he likely have Grumman stock options, but his very employment and
livelihood were at stake if he disenchanted Grumman. Consequently, he
might have been conflicted out of this dual representation on this basis as
well. Id. at R. 1.7(a)(2).
124. See id. at R. 1.7 cmt. 29 ("Ordinarily, the lawyer will be forced to
withdraw from representing all of the clients if the common representation
fails.").
125. See supra, Part III.C (discussing former clients and the limits imposed
by Rule 1.9).
126. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.9(a) (emphasis added). As
argued previously, the interests of the plan and the company seem "materially
adverse," so Mullan should not have been permitted to represent the company
in the LTV manner. See id. at R. 1.9(b)(1) (stating that a lawyer cannot
represent a person whose interests are "materially adverse" to those of a
former client. Although Rule 1.9(a) allows for informed written consent, it is
hard to see how the trustees of the plan in that capacity could give that
consent in good faith, since they themselves, in their corporate capacity, would
benefit from that consent. In other words, this looks like a situation where
consent may not be given. See supra notes 80 and 122 and accompanying text.
In any event, and at the very least, to the extent that independent counsel is
brought in to advise the plan, that counsel would have to make sure that if
consent were to be given to a joint representation by the plan, that such a
decision would be based on the best interests of the plan's participants and
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the company's and plan's interests were not considered "materially
adverse" in the LTV manner, given that an independent counsel
could have conceivably come to a conclusion that the plan trustees
should not have offered up their shares to LTV; nevertheless, "a
lawyer who has formerly represented a client shall not thereafter:
(1) use information ... to the disadvantage of the former client...;
or (2) reveal information relating to the representation.... 127 In
short, Mullan would have been hard-pressed to diligently and
competently continue to represent Grumman, even solely in its
employer capacity, with these limitations placed on his
representation. 2 '
V. DISCOURAGING THE JOINT REPRESENTATION OF ERISA DUAL
ROLE FIDUCIARIES THROUGH USE OF THE MODEL RULES
A. The Inadequacy of the Current Model Rules in Guiding
Corporate Counsel's Representation of ERISA Dual Role
Fiduciaries
The foregoing analysis of the Donovan case under the
current version of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
suggests that corporate counsel who find themselves in these
ERISA joint representation scenarios are left to dangle in the
ethical winds. Although use of the current Model Rules leads to
the same conclusion arrived at in Donovan, that counseling dual
role fiduciaries in both their employer and plan capacity is almost
never a good idea,'29 there will still be the temptation for
beneficiaries and not based on decisions made by those personally involved in
the conflict of interest like the officers/trustees of Grumann in the Donovan
case.
127. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.9(c) (emphasis added). Mullan
could only use such information about the plan if the information had become
general knowledge or the Rules would permit or require such use of the
information with respect to the client. Id.
128. Note that under Rule 1.9(b), if Mullan had instead been outside counsel
for either the plan or company, and attempted to move to a different law firm
to represent the plan, he would still be at the mercy of Grumman to provide
informed consent in writing. Just as with the in-house counsel situation,
receiving consent from Grumann under these circumstances would be unlikely
given that Mullan would probably have acquired information about Grumman
during his former representation which would be protected by the
confidentiality provisions of Rule 1.6. See id. at R. 1.9(b)(2).
129. But see Spencer, supra note 82 at 1-17:
Depending on the specific issue the attorney is handling, such multiple
representation can be more a benefit to the clients than a disadvantage.
By retaining a single counsel who, through longstanding contact, is
thoroughly familiar with the employer's business and the sponsored
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companies to permit such legal arrangements. On the one hand,
companies looking to save money on increasingly costly pension
and health plans will rely upon corporate counsel in advising them
on fiduciary matters to the extent that they undertake the plan
trustee role. 3' Indeed, many employers may place themselves in
these dual-role positions in the first place simply to avoid the extra
cost of having to hire a third-party plan administrator.' Of
course, it may just be that companies are willing to waive
whatever prospective conflicts there might be in order to have the
comfort of retaining a familiar benefits counsel."' Finally,
regardless of the inevitable conflicts of interest which will arise
under these circumstances, it might be that corporate counsel will
not have the strength of conviction to raise these concerns (as
Mullan seemed unwilling to do in Donovan), or they will not
discern the relevant ethical issues in the first place."'
Consequently, the difficult position in which attorneys like Mullan
find themselves will most likely continue to exist.
On the other hand, requiring companies to hire independent
counsel to advise the plan when there are conflicts of interest
between the plan and company seems incompatible with the
plans, the parties are more likely to receive competent legal advice at a
reasonable cost. Interposing ethical constraints that are more
theoretical than real, detracts from this efficiency and increases
transaction costs through the hiring of new attorneys to service
theoretical individual interests. Although the concerns of economic
efficiency will not overcome the real (and truly disqualifying) conflict, it
should have at least some influence on the resolution of the various
problems associated with multiple representation in ERISA.
130. In fact, because ERISA makes the employer the "default" plan
administrator, there is no reason to believe that there will be less dual role
fiduciaries in the near future. ERISA § 3(16)(A)(ii).
131. See Spencer, supra note 82, at 1-17 ("By retaining a single counsel who,
through longstanding contact, is thoroughly familiar with the employer's
business and the sponsored plans, the parties are more likely to receive
competent legal advice at a reasonable cost."); see also Fischel & Langbein,
supra note 25, at 1127 (suggesting that permitting dual role fiduciaries
promotes the rate of plan formation under ERISA by giving employers
investment and design authority).
132. See Spencer, supra note 82, at 1-17. Concerning prospective waivers of
conflicts of interests, such waivers succeed or fail by the same conditions set
out in Rule 1.7(b), but their enforceability also depends to a large extent on
whether the clients reasonably understand the material risks that the waiver
entails. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 22.
133. The likelihood that corporate counsel will not perceive the relevant
conflicts of interest in such joint representations is most likely to occur when
corporate counsel has no specific expertise in the complex area of ERISA and
inadvertently undertakes such a representation. EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW,
supra note 20, at 1441-42.
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voluntary nature of offering ERISA plans13 and the subsidiary
purpose of ERISA in not making it too costly for employers to
provide employee benefit plans in the first place."5 Moreover, and
by and large, most ethical rules under the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct are appropriately discretionary to some
extent and "[it is not ... the purpose of the Model Rules to
legislate specific ethical mandates."'36 In short, it does not seem
appropriate to promulgate a mandatory ethical rule when in some
circumstances counsel could reasonably believe jointly
representing the company in its employer and plan capacity would
not interfere with diligent and competent representation of both
parties.'37
Nevertheless, an advisory rule concerning joint
representation of ERISA dual role fiduciaries would still be
valuable since by the relationship's very nature, dual capacity
fiduciaries are inherently conflicted.'38 In other words, there will
most likely come a time when there will be another conflict of
interest between the company and the plan even after the initial
134. See Susan J. Stabile, Freedom to Choose Unwisely: Congress' Misguided
Decision to Leave 401(k) Participants to Their Own Devices, 11 CORNELL J. L.
& PUB. POLWY 361, 400 (2002) ("Any suggestion for pension reform must be
assessed in light of the reality that pension plan sponsorship is voluntary.
ERISA imposes significant substantive regulation on pension plans, but leaves
the decision whether to offer a pension plan in the first place to employers.").
135. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 262-63 (1993) (describing
the "subsidiary goal" of ERISA as "containing pension costs").
136. See Paul M. Secunda, Note, Cleaning Up The Chicken Coop of
Sentencing Uniformity: Guiding the Discretion of Federal Prosecutors Through
the Use of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 34 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 1267,
1291 (1997).
137. Accord Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility
Codes: Theory, Practice, and the Paradigm of Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 223, 234 (1993) ("Unlike legislators, code drafters perceive their
goal as providing guidance for lawyers in choosing among several permissible
courses of conduct.").
138. See Laurence B. Wohl, Fiduciary Duties Under ERISA: A Tale of
Multiple Loyalties, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV 43, 52 (1994) ("The ERISA conflict of
interest arises when ERISA fiduciaries hold positions as officers, directors or
employees of the corporate or union sponsor of the ERISA plan of which they
are a fiduciary. Because ERISA permits fiduciaries to hold offices which
contain inherent conflicts, criteria must be established that permit the
fiduciary and the courts to determine in what capacity a specific act will be, or
was, taken."); Kathryn J. Kennedy, Judicial Standards of Review in ERISA
Benefit Claim Cases, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1083, 1115-16 (2001) ("[Tlhe existence
or nonexistence of an interest in the fiduciary conflicting with that of the
beneficiaries has been the most controversial in ERISA benefit denial cases, as
the employer/insurer is often the plan administrator and funding source of the
ERISA plan and, thus, there is an inherent conflict of interest.").
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conflict of interest is resolved.'39 Such conflicts may concern as
important of an issue as the future survival of the company as in
Donovan v. Bierwirth, a more mundane decision such as whether
to increase funding of the pension plan (and thus not pay out a
dividend), or whether to offer an early retirement incentive based
on a pension fund surplus.14 In short, because counsel who jointly
represents a company in the employer and plan capacity will most
likely face a concurrent conflict of interest at some point in time
during the joint representation, it would be better to discourage
joint representation initially, so that difficult and costly decisions
about plan representation need not be made in the midst of a
controversy or dispute. 1 ' It is with this consideration in mind that
this article in the next section proposes a new Model Rule which
discourages corporate counsel from jointly representing an ERISA
dual role fiduciary in both its employer and plan fiduciary
capacities.
B. Proposed Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.13(h)
with Commentary
Based on the foregoing discussion, this Section proposes a
new provision to be added to Rule 1.13, concerning the
representation of organizations. Under proposed Model Rule
1.13(h), in those particular circumstances in which a company
decides to undertake the duties of an ERISA dual role fiduciary,
this new provision would put in place a presumption against
corporate counsel, whether in-house or outside counsel, from
representing the plan in both capacities. This presumption,
139. See Laby, supra note 53, at 141 ("When the same plan fiduciary,
however, also serves as an officer or director, and therefore as a fiduciary to
the company shareholders (and the company itself), conflicts inevitably
arise."); see also Elizabeth J. Buck, Making a Prudent Response to a Tender
Offer: The Corporation Trustee's Dilemma Under ERISA, 32 AM. U. L. REV.
839 (1983) ("The inherent conflicts of interest that ERISA creates by allowing
corporate officials to serve as pension plan trustees are unique and may be
irreconcilable as well.").
140. Such an early retirement plan and the use of pension plan surplus
assets were at issue in the ERISA fiduciary case of Lockheed Corp. v. Spink,
517 U.S. 882 (1996).
141. See Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 272-73 (2d Cir. 1982)
(remarking that ERISA dual role fiduciaries would do well to receive legal
advice "from someone above the battle"); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 29 ("In considering whether to represent multiple clients
in the same matter, a lawyer should be mindful that if the common
representation fails because the potentially adverse interests cannot be
reconciled, the result can be additional cost, embarrassment and
recrimination.").
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however, can be rebutted by meeting the four conditions set out for
resolving concurrent conflicts of interest under current Model Rule
1.7(b). In other words, if corporate counsel reasonably believes she
can diligently and competently represent both the company and
the plan in the long term, she can then ethically advise the
company and the plan to give their informed written consent to
such a joint representation.'4 2 Nonetheless, if the company should
disagree with the attorney's reasonable belief in this regard and
refuse to consent to joint representation, such a joint
representation would be impermissible under Rule 1.7(b)(4).
As proposed, Rule 1.13(h) would only apply to dual role
fiduciaries in the ERISA context. This is because as a first matter,
dual role fiduciaries do not exist under the common law of trusts
because such trustees are not permitted to place themselves in an
inherently conflicted position, inconsistent with their duty of
loyalty to the trust's beneficiaries." Moreover, although a conflict
of duties often exists in other fiduciary relationships outside of the
ERISA context,'" it is rare that these other "fiduciary duty"
conflicts exist within the same company, let alone within the same
torn person as occurs with ERISA dual role fiduciaries.
In other words, and as argued above, ERISA § 408(c)(3)
represents a case of ERISA exceptionalism, in which ERISA
permits a significant departure from the common law of trusts and
the trustee's duty of loyalty found therein.4  Consequently,
142. Of course, such joint representations would always be impermissible
where direct adversity leads to litigation between the employer and the plan.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(3).
143. See Langbein, supra note 35, at 931 (stating that currently a trustee's
duty of loyalty under the common law is widely regarded as "the most
fundamental" rule of trust law) (citing George Gleason Bogert & George
Taylor Bogert, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 543, at 217 (2d ed. 1993);
Austin Wakeman Scott & William Franklin Fratcher, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §
170, at 311 (4th ed. 1987); Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 224 (2000)). As
noted above, Professor Langbein has recently suggested a migration from the
duty of loyalty's "sole interest" standard to a more modern "best interest"
standard. See Langbein, supra note 35, at 933-34.
144. See generally Laby, supra note 53 (discussing conflicts of duty in
fiduciary relationships involving ERISA and non-ERISA contexts).
145. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 264-65 (1993) (White, J.,
dissenting) ("[Aibsent some express statutory departure-such as ERISA's
broader definition of a responsible 'fiduciary,'. .. Congress intended that the
courts would look to the settled experience of the common law in giving shape
to a 'federal common law of rights and obligations under ERISA-regulated
plans."') (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110
(1989)). Section 408(c)(3) of ERISA, permitting inherently conflict dual role
fiduciaries, is one such statutory departure from the common law of trusts.
See Medill, supra note 53, at 409; Langbein, supra note 35, at 950-51 ("ERISA
allows the plan sponsor to use company officers and other personnel as plan
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because such problematic joint representations of dual role
fiduciaries primarily occur under ERISA, proposed Rule 1.13(h) is
only intended to apply to lawyers who seek to jointly represent
dual role fiduciaries in the ERISA context.
This new provision, Model Rule 1.13(h), with commentary,
should state as follows:
RULE 1.13: ORGANIZATION AS CLIENT
(h) A lawyer representing a corporation in its employer, settlor,
plan sponsor, or corporate capacity should generally not also jointly
represent that same corporation if it also acts as a plan
administrator, fiduciary, or trustee to an employee benefit plan,
unless the lawyer reasonably believes that she can comply with the
requirements for resolving concurrent conflict of interests under
Rule 1.7(b).
COMMENTARY
ERISA DUAL ROLE FIDUCIARIES
[36] Although ERISA permits companies and its officers, directors,
and employees to act as both employer and plan fiduciary at the
same time, see ERISA § 408(c)(3), a lawyer for a corporation
ordinarily should not represent the company in both capacities
because of the inherently conflicting nature of such joint
representations. Nevertheless, although Model Rule 1.13(h) sets up
a presumption against such joint representations, a lawyer for a
corporation may nevertheless jointly represent the company in both
employer and fiduciary capacities if she reasonably believes she can
meet all the conditions set out for resolving concurrent conflicts of
interest under Rule 1.7(b).
[37] To the extent that a lawyer for a corporation previously or
currently represents the company in both its employer and plan
fiduciary capacities, whether purposefully or through inadvertence,
that lawyer should reevaluate whether continuing that joint
representation is consistent with its ethical responsibilities to
diligently and competently represent both entities under Rule
1.7(b)(1). If such joint representation is no longer ethically feasible,
the lawyer for the corporation should withdraw from representing
the plan and only continue to represent the employer to the extent
fiduciaries, hence the statute 'expressly contemplates fiduciaries with dual
loyalties,' which is 'an unorthodox departure from the common law rule.'")
(quoting Donovan v. Bierwirth, 538 F. Supp. 463, 468 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), affd as
modified, 680 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1982)).
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consistent with that lawyer's ethical obligations concerning former
clients under Rule 1.9.
[38] Rule 1.13(h) is meant to apply to only the unique situation of
dual role fiduciary joint representations under ERISA. This is
because ERISA, unlike the common law of trusts, permits an
inherently conflicted state of affairs in which a corporation is
permitted to act in both an employer and plan fiduciary capacity.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article's formal analysis of a counsel's ethical obligations
under the current version of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct in dual role fiduciary cases under ERISA makes evident
that the current version of the Model Rules does not provide
adequate guidance to corporate counsel finding themselves in
these complex, inherently conflicted situations. Proposed Model
Rule 1.13(h), and its commentary, would emphatically discourage
corporate counsel from engaging in these risky joint ERISA
representations, as such representations inevitably lead to
conflicts of interest requiring counsel to withdraw from
representing one or both entities." Thus, the newly proposed
Rule 1.13(h) would not only help corporate counsel discern the
identity of their clients in these complicated ERISA dual role
fiduciary circumstances, but would also guide counsel in
undertaking the best practice in such situations by avoiding joint
representation of the company in both its employer and plan
fiduciary capacities in the first instance.
146. As discussed above, even if it were technically feasible for counsel to
continue representing the company in its employer capacity, such
representation would most likely be fatally limited based on the former client
restrictions placed on counsel under Model Rule 1.9. See supra Part III.C.
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